CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD J. HUGHESARCHITECT OF A RESPONSIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Leon S. Milmed*
The administrative process is a governmental tool. It is no
more conservative or liberal than the automobile that carries the
bureaucrat to his work. It can be used to go right, left, or down
the center of the road. It is used both as an instrument of law
reform and as a protection against law reform.'
Author of landmark opinions designed to insure and protect fundam ental rights in other vital areas, 2 Chief Justice Hughes has clearly
earned distinction as architect and effective advocate of a responsive
administrative process, one which vigilantly seeks to assure fair
treatment to the individual while fostering enlightened understanding
and cooperation between the individual and state government. His
has been a truly compassionate approach to law reform.
Following adoption of the 1947 State Constitution, then Governor Alfred- E. Driscoll, in his annual message to the Legislature in
January 1948, urged enactment of legislation "to make the procedure
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1 I KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §1.12, at 52 (2d ed. 1978); see

id. §1.03, at 14 (1958).
1 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975), republished, 69 N.J. 133,
351 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). In Robinson, the Chief Justice commented: "The people in 1875 ordained the Legislature to be their
agent to effectuate an educational system but did not intend to tolerate an unconstitutional
vacuum should the Legislature default in seeing to their specification that the system be
thorough and efficient." 67 N.J. at 352, 339 A.2d at 202-03. In In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), he stressed that
"the law, equity and justice must not themselves quail and be helpless in the face of modern
technological marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought of." Id. at 44, 355 A.2d at 665.
In In re Yengo, 72 N.J. 425, 371 A.2d 41 (1977), the Chief Justice warned "[a]n intoxication
with judicial power which would ignore basic constitutional precepts is a wholly unacceptable
syndrome that cannot be tolerated in New Jersey courts." Id. at 450, 371 A.2d at 57. And, in In
re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 351 A.2d 740 (1976), the decision was arrived at "with an appreciation
of the emergence and the social and legal recognition of spousal autonomy and retention of
separate identities and interests, notwithstanding the sympathetic relationship of an ongoing
marriage ..
" Id. at 194, 351 A.2d at 744-45.
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of our administrative agencies conform to accepted standards of fair
and uniform administration according to the rule of law."

3

The Gov-

ernor's drive to achieve a forward-looking state administrative procedure act enlisted support from many individuals and groups. Among
those in the forefront were Arthur T. Vanderbilt, then Chief Justice
designate, Nathan L. Jacobs, later Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, Milton B. Conford, later Presiding Judge for Administration of
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, and Alfred C. Clapp,
then State Senator from Essex County, editor of the New Jersey Law
Journal and later Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division. Despite
vigorous efforts on its behalf, however, the proposed "beneficial and
much needed legislation" 4 fell short of adoption. In this respect the
modernization of our state government provided by the new state
constitution and the innovations flowing from it remained incomplete.
While further attempts to secure passage of an administrative
procedure act were made in succeeding legislative sessions, it was not
until 1968, during the administration of then Governor Richard J.
Hughes, that a model Act was brought to fruition. In that year the
Legislature adopted Senate No. 667, designed to regulate practice
and procedure of state administrative agencies. The measure was presented to the Governor but returned by him to the Senate with his
objections, for reconsideration. 5 His eleven page conditional veto
message accompanying the return of the bill attests to his extensive
and comprehensive analysis of the measure and his dedication to the
task of assuring "that its provisions reflect both the needs and the
nature of New Jersey's government and its people." 6 He recommended amendments to "ease administrative difficulties, and yet, ...
preserve the protections and benefits to both the people and the government so clearly intended by the Legislature.' 7 The bill was
amended and re-enacted with his recommendations, 8 and today
3 [1948] MANUAL OF THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 676, 679 (Governor Driscoll's
First Annual Message). In his annual message, the Governor pointed out that:

This will require that we establish by statute a code of administration and procedure
which will apply to the various departments resulting from the reorganization [pursuant to 1947 N.J. CONST. art. V, § IV, para. 11. We have in the new Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, and the long legislative history behind it, a very useful
source from which to develop legislation best fitted to our needs.
Id.
4 Editorial, Revising Our Administrative Procedure, 71 N.J.L.J. 140 (Apr. 15, 1948).

5 See N.J.

CONST.

art. V, § I, para. 14(b).

6 Conditional Veto Message of December 27, 1968, at 1.
7 Id.
8 The legislation was approved January 14, 1969. An Act concerning practice and procedure of administrative agencies of the State, [1968] N.J. Laws ch. 410, at 1408, 1417 (N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 52: 14B-1 to -15 (West 1970)).
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stands as a monument to his devotion to basic principles of responsible and responsive government. What was said regarding the Federal Administrative Procedure Act by United States Senator Pat
McCarran, while chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
is equally applicable to the state version which was fashioned by Governor Hughes and the Legislature in 1968.
The Administrative Procedure Act is a strongly marked, long
sought, and widely heralded advance in democratic government. It
embarks upon a new field of legislation of broad application in the
"administrative" area of government lying between the traditional
legislative and fundamental judicial processes on the one hand and
authorized executive functions on the other. Although it is brief, it
is a comprehensive charter of private liberty and a solemn undertaking of official fairness. It is intended as a guide to him who
seeks fair play and equal rights under law, as well as to those invested with executive authority. It upholds law and yet lightens
the burden of those on whom the law may impinge. It enunciates
and emphasizes the tripartite form of our democracy and brings
into relief the ever essential declaration that this is a government
of law rather than of men. 9

And so, after a struggle extending over two decades, it was under the
effective leadership of Richard Hughes, in partnership with a cooperative Legislature, that New Jersey ultimately achieved a giant
step forward in the development of administrative law. 10
Richard Hughes became Chief Justice of the State Supreme
Court in December 1973. Since then, he has on many occasions
called for a more responsive administrative process, bottomed on firm
principles of "rightness and fairness." His opinions in the field of administrative law effectively attest to the strength of what Professor
Jaffe refers to as a reason for judicial review of agency action:
The very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought
into harmony with the totality of the law; the law as it is found in
the statute at hand, the statute book at large, the principles and

9 Quoted in Gwynne, Administrative ProcedureAct: A Warning Against Its Impairment by

Legislation, 34 A.B.A.J. 8 (Jan. 1948).
1oSee Editorial, The A.P.A. Enacted, 92 N.J.L.J. 52 (Jan. 23, 1969). See also the reported
comments of the President of the State Bar Association in the news item: Administrative Procedure Act Adopted, appearing in the same issue of the Law Journal. 92 N.J.L.J. 49 (Jan. 23,
1969).
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conceptions of the "common law," and the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution."
In Avant v. Clifford,12 the Chief Justice demonstrated not only
his deep understanding and appreciation of due process requirements, but at the same time his insistence that agency action be
grounded on fair treatment, both of the individual and of the public
interests. The case involved a challenge to disciplinary procedures in
effect in the state prison system. 13 The Chief Justice's direct and
positive approach to the issue became immediately evident when he
declared:
While we consider here procedural due process in its constitutional sense, it should also be remembered that in the exercise by
New Jersey courts of their function of review (as here) of the action
of administrative agencies (such as the Department of Institutions
and Agencies), we have not been satisfied with enforcement of
naked constitutional right, but have gone further to strike down
arbitrary action and administrative abuse and to insure procedural
14
fairness in the administrative process.
Not content with mere recognition of procedural due process
rights of state prison inmates in prison disciplinary proceedings detailed by the United States Supreme Court in its 1974 landmark opinion in Wolff v. McDonnell,' 5 and obviously concerned for the impartial character of the disciplinary hearings, the Chief Justice said:
Beyond Wolff, however, we think the "rightness and fairness"
standard now firmly established in New Jersey law would better be
satisfied if two members of the Adjustment Committee 16 were not
to be selected from the correctional officer staff. The pervasive and
understandable friction between correctional officers and prisoners
noted in Wolff ought not be exacerbated by two of the three members of the "impartial tribunal" being correctional personnel. Thus,
from now on there must be no more than one correctional officer
on the Adjustment Committee. 17 Ideally, the supervisory correc11 Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 239, 275 (1955); Jaffe, The
Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 410 (1958).
12 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975).
13 The agency's actions in promulgating standards governing such procedures are, in light of

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-2(a) (West 1970), "exempt from subjection to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act." 67 N.J. at 557, 341 A.2d at 662.
14 67 N.J. at 520, 341 A.2d at 642 (footnote omitted).
15 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
16 The Adjustment Committee conducts disciplinary hearings in the institution.
17 By agency regulation, "any staff member who reported, investigated or, under normal

circumstances, witnessed the incident being considered" and "any staff member who played a
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tional officer and the institutional staff member might be joined by
an institutional "outsider" such as a departmental official from the
central office, or some like designee whose membership on the
committee would dilute the apparent, though unintended, overbalancing of the Adjustment Committee (as presently constituted)
by members of the correctional officers staff.' 8
Additionally, the Chief Justice urged amendment of the agency
Standards to require "that in those cases where the Committee
'deems' confrontation and cross-examination '[un]necessary for al
adequate presentation of the evidence' (Standard 254.274) the reasons
for such denial be entered in the record and made available to the
inmate."19 He reasoned:
Such a requirement would appear to us to represent a more precise accommodation of the competing interests and would afford
greater flexibility than would an absolute bar to or requirement of
confrontation and cross-examination. A further advantage to be derived from this requirement would be that compliance therewith
would provide prima facie evidence which will enable reviewing
authorities (see Standard 254.288) and, if necessary, the courts, to
determine whether or not there has been a proper exercise of dis2
cretion. 0
He added that with this refinement of the agency Standards, "the
hearing provided in the case of inmate disciplinary infractions is com21
pletely adequate to meet standards of 'fairness' and due process."
Avant also proceeded to solve what the Chief Justice termed
"the nagging problem" of how to accommodate "the important parallel interests of the state in institutional security and criminal prosecution while offering full protection to the inmate's dual rights, i.e., his
right to be heard in defense or extenuation of the charge against him
' 22
and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. "
Pointing out that "[t]o be free to speak in defense or extenuation, a
way must be found to immunize whatever the prisoner says or whatever evidence may be derived from what he says from use against
him in a subsequent criminal proceeding for the establishment of
guilt of the offense involved,"23 the opinion adopted the "use"
significant part in having the charges referred to the committee," may not sit as a member of
the Adjustment Committee. See 67 N.J. at 526, 341 A.2d at 646.
18 Id. at 526-27, 341 A.2d at 646.
19 Id. at 532, 341 A.2d at 649.
20 Id.
21

Id.

22 Id. at 537-38, 341 A.2d at 652 (footnote omitted).
23

Id. at 540-41, 341 A.2d at 653.
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immunity approach stated by a federal district court in Sands v.
Wainwright.24 Thus:
with regard to testimony given at any type of prison disciplinary
proceedings including those in which the grievous loss is, as
heretofore defined, punitive segregation, administrative segregation
or the loss of any type of gain time, the inmate therein proceeded
against is in each such case entitled to "use" immunity in a subsequent criminal prosecution to the extent that his statements shall
not be used affirmatively against him. [357 F. Supp. at 1093].25

While acknowledging the need, in the circumstances, for the grant of
a "use" immunity, the Chief Justice at the same time indicated his
agreement with the Second Circuit in Uniformed Sanitation Men Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of New York, 2 6 that
such "use" immunity "is 'relatively costless' since 'the government, as
prosecutor, is in substantially the same position*** as it would have
been if the witness [respondent prisoner] had insisted on remaining
silent.' "27
Beyond this, on the issue of sufficiency of legislative standards to
guide agency exercise of its delegated authority,2 8 Avant lends added
strength to New Jersey's modern approach which recognizes that
' 1the exigencies of modern government have increasingly
dictated
the use of general rather than minutely detailed standards in regulatory enactments under the police power.' "29 The Chief Justice
noted that here it is in the context of an
elaborate legislative scheme that the Commissioner exercises the
authority given him by N.J.S.A. 30:1-12. .

.

. Added to this, of

course, must be considered his inherent authority for the maintenance of discipline, and the promulgation of reasonable rules to
that end, which necessarily accompanies the legislative assignment
to him of responsibility for the governance of the institutions. 3"

24

judge

357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded, (for failure to convene a threedistrict court), 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974).

67 N.J. at 542, 341 A.2d at 654.
426 F.2d 619, 628 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972) (previous decision at
383 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1967), revd, 392 U.S. 280 (1968)).
27 67 N.J. at 543, 341 A.2d at 655.
2'8 Here, "to determine general policy and to promulgate rules and regulations pertaining to
administration of the correctional institutions of the state . . . ""Id. at 547, 341 A.2d at 657.
29 Id. at 550, 341 A.2d at 658-59 (quoting from Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 123-24, 93 A.2d
25
26

385, 388 (1952)).
30 67 N.J. at 549, 341 A.2d at 658.
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A further insight into the Chief Justice's deep concern for a responsive administrative process is afforded by his opinion in Pascucci
v. Vagott. 1l At issue there was the validity of a regulation of the
Division of Public Welfare, then in the Department of Institutions
and Agencies, setting lower levels of financial assistance to eligible
needy persons classified
as "employable" than to those classified as
"unemployable." 32 The regulation provided for a maximum allowance of $178 per month to adults who "because of physical, mental or
emotional handicaps are unable to accept employment," a class designated as unemployable; and, as to employable adults, the regulation
limited the monthly allowance to $119.33

The individual appellants,

welfare recipients, were classified as employables and thus relegated
to the lower level of assistance.
Combining compassion with forceful logic, the Chief Justice concluded that the regulatory discrimination "must be set aside as to
those who are unemployed solely because of lack of employment opportunity." 3 4 After disclosing an obvious conflict between this regulatory discrimination and the legislative standard,3 5 he observed:
While a broad grant of authority to the Commissioner may
encompass different treatment of various classes of recipients, the
Commissioner's powers in this regard are not unlimited. And even
though accorded the benefit of the presumption of validity and
regularity generally afforded to administrative regulations, such
regulatory discrimination must be reasonable and not arbitrary and
be in overall furtherance of the broad welfare assistance goals of
the Legislature ...
In this respect a conflict seems apparent between the legislative standard of N.J.S.A. 44:8-108 describing as eligible needy persons those who are unemployable either because of physical disability or job unavailability, and the regulation which improperly
breaks down the one category into two....
31 71 N.J. 40, 362 A.2d 566 (1976).
32 Id. at 43, 362 A.2d at 568.
33 id. at 44, 362 A.2d at 568.
34 Id. at 50, 362 A.2d at 572. As to the three individual appellants, the decision was made
retroactive in application. As to all others similarly situated it was made "prospective in nature"

to become "effective not earlier than 60 days from the date of filing of this opinion." Id.
35 Embodied in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-108 which, he noted, at the time defined "public
assistance" to mean
assistance rendered to needy persons not otherwise provided for under the laws of

this State, where such persons are willing to work but are unable to secure
employment due either to physical disability or inability to find employment ....
71 N.J. at 49, 362 A.2d at 571 (emphasis added). For amendments to the statute following the
decision in Pascucci v. Vagott, see An Act to amend the "General Public Assistance Law,"
approved May 13, 1947 (P.L. 1947, c. 156), [1977] N.J. Laws ch. 286, at 1109-12 (N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 44:8-108 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)).
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Respondents 3 6 'Would defend the discriminatory employableunemployable classification by suggesting that unemployables
probably have special needs justifying higher benefit levels. Yet no
one has come forward with factual data, studies or reports to establish that the unemployed "employable" suffers less from cold,
hunger or sickness, or pays less for food, shelter or clothing, that
his human misery is lessened where joblessness results from
economic handicaps rather than mental, emotional or physical im37
pediments.

And, in In re Suspension of Heller,38 we find his insistence that
where "the task of the regulatory agency is 'to protect the health and
welfare of members of the public' by assuring that all licensed practitioners are qualified, competent and honest, the grant of implied
39
powers is particularly important."
These are some examples of Richard Hughes' dedication to the advancement of a sound administrative process. Blessed by unique opportunity and ability to lead both the executive and judicial branches
of our state government, he has built into that process lasting benefits
of fair play and understanding for all the people of New Jersey of this
and future generations.

36 The respondents in the case were state and local welfare agencies and officials.
37 71 N.J. at 50, 362 A.2d at 571-72 (citations omitted).
38 73 N.J. 292, 374 A.2d 1191 (1977).
39 1d. at 303-04, 374 A.2d at 1197.

